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Pinto: Venue on Commercial Carriers

DETERMINING JURISDICTIONAL VENUE FOR CRIMES ON
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS
Madeline Pinto

I. INTRODUCTION

The scene is all too familiar. Airline passengers cramped in narrow
economy cabin seats in uncomfortable proximity to strangers. The
stresses of travel have created a palpable atmosphere of heightened
emotions, short fuses, and general irritation. Throughout the flight, one
particularly long-legged passenger kicks the seat of the passenger in
front of him, foiling her plans to take a nap. The female passenger turns
around to confront her rude cabin mate, but instead of the brief
exchange of polite apologies one expects from such an encounter, the
conversation grows heated and one passenger strikes the other. What
was once an ordinary commercial flight has instantly become a
constitutional conundrum on the issue of venue.
Venue is an essential component of every criminal defendant’s
constitutional right to a fair trial.1 Venue is a legal term that refers to
the place where an individual’s trial will be held.2 Drawing from their
own experience with colonial trials in England, the Framers of the
Constitution (“Framers”) were concerned that forcing a criminal
defendant to be tried in an unfamiliar state would create undue
hardship and undermine the criminal defendant’s fundamental right to
a fair trial.3 To guard against this potential injustice, Article III of the
Constitution mandates that all crimes be tried “in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed.”4 The Sixth Amendment
reiterates the importance of venue, requiring that “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a … trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed.”5 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reflect
this constitutional mandate, specifying that “the government must
prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed”
and “the court must set the place of trial within the district with due
regard for the convenience of the defendant, any victim, and the

1. United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th Cir. 2012).
2. Venue,
MIRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/venue
[https://perma.cc/H7UP-UK77].
3. United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 2014).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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witnesses, and the prompt administration of justice.”6 Congress has the
power to enact individual venue statutes that pre-determine venue
decisions for particular categories of crimes.7 However, Congress has
exercised this power only sparingly.8 Determinations of proper venue
for the vast majority of crimes hinge on the district in which the crime
was committed.9
The constitutional importance of venue in criminal prosecutions is
clear. But thinking back to the commercial flight example, in what
venue can the female passenger be properly tried for the assault? In
exactly which state and district did the female passenger strike the
male passenger as the airplane moved at high speed across the country?
Does it even matter under these strange circumstances? Can the
government simply prosecute the female passenger where the flight
took off or where it landed? As the world grows increasingly
interconnected and the frequency and volume of commercial airline
travel skyrockets, these questions of proper venue for in-flight crimes
will only grow in importance.10
The federal circuit courts are split as to whether the proper venue
for an in-flight crime is the specific district above which the crime
occurred or any district “from, through, or into which” the flight
moved.11 This Casenote reviews the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (“section 3237(a)”) as conferring
venue for in-flight crimes in any district through which the flight
traveled and the Ninth Circuit’s determination that an in-flight crime
can be properly prosecuted only in the specific district above which
the crime occurred.12 Part II analyzes relevant statutes and prior case
law related to the issue of determining venue. Part III explains why the
Ninth Circuit adopted the correct interpretation of section 3237(a).
II. BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court has addressed venue in a few instances. Section
A of this part reviews the Supreme Court’s treatment of venue in
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.
7. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33223, VENUE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF WHERE
A FEDERAL CRIME MAY BE TRIED 12-14 (2018).
8. See id. at 12.
9. See id.
10. Bureau of Transp. Statistics, 2018 Traffic Data for U.S. Airlines and Foreign Airlines U.S.
Flights, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.bts.dot.gov/newsroom/2018-traffic-data-us-airlines-andforeign-airlines-us-flights (March 21, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PY9A-K9FW].
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).
12. See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cope,
676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 2019).
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United States v. Johnson13 and Congress’s decision to enact section
3237(a) as a direct response to the Johnson decision. Section B then
details the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. RodriguezMoreno14 and Ashcroft v. ACLU15 following the passage of section
3237(a). Section C summarizes the federal circuit courts’ various
interpretations of section 3237(a). Lastly, Section D details and
compares the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Breitweiser,16 the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cope,17
and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Lozoya.18
A. An Early Look at Venue: The Supreme Court’s Decision in United
States v. Johnson and Congress’ Legislative Response

In United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court was tasked with
determining the outcome of a rarely litigated issue: venue.19 The issue
in Johnson was whether several defendants charged with violating the
Federal Denture Act were properly tried in Delaware.20 While located
in Illinois, the defendants violated the Act by mailing dentures to
Delaware that were cast by a person not licensed to practice dentistry
in Delaware.21 The Court reasoned that Congress possesses the
authority to insert venue provisions into criminal statutes that define
the underlying crime as a continuing offense.22 The continuing offense
may then be tried in any district through which the offense moved.23
However, the Court noted that determinations of venue in criminal
cases “are not merely matters of formal legal procedure” but involve
“deep issues of public policy.”24 Thus, when the venue provision of a
criminal statute equally permits a defendant to be tried in the specific
district where the crime occurred and in every district through which
the crime moved, courts must interpret the venue provision narrowly
to permit trial only in the specific district where the crime was
committed.25 The more restrictive interpretation of venue provisions
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

323 U.S. 273 (1944).
526 U.S. 275 (1999).
535 U.S. 564 (2002).
357 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004).
676 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2012).
920 F.3d. 1231 (9th Cir. 2019).
323 U.S. at 274.
Id.
Id. at 273-74.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 275-76.
Id.
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in Johnson is consistent with the policy considerations underlying the
venue safeguards included in the Constitution.26 Because Congress did
not include a specific venue provision in the Federal Denture Act, the
Court concluded that the Federal Denture Act was reasonably
susceptible to either interpretation.27 Therefore, the Court held that
under the Federal Denture Act, a defendant must be tried in the specific
district in which the mailing of the illegal dentures occurred and, thus,
in the present case, venue was not proper in Delaware.28
Congress passed section 3237(a) in direct response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Johnson.29 Section 3237(a) provides that “any
offense against the United States begun in one district and completed
in another, or committed in more than one district” may be tried in
“any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or
completed.” Additionally, the second paragraph of the statue provides
that “any offense involving the use of the mails, transportation in
interstate or foreign commerce, or the importation of an object or
person into the United States is a continuing offense” that may be tried
“in any district from, through, or into which such commerce, mail
matter, or imported object or person moves.”30 Capitalizing on the
congressional authority the Court recognized in Johnson, Congress
passed section 3237(a) as a specific venue provision that would
remove all doubt as to whether offenses such as the mailing of dentures
in violation of the Federal Denture Act are to be considered continuing
offenses that may be tried in any district in which the offense
occurred.31 In this way, Congress precluded the Court from narrowly
interpreting the Federal Denture Act and similar criminal offenses
involving the use of the mails or transportation in interstate commerce
to only allow a defendant to be tried in the specific district in which
the crime began.32
B. The Supreme Court’s Venue Decisions After Section 3237(a)

In United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, the Supreme Court
determined whether venue in a prosecution for using or carrying a
firearm in a kidnapping was proper in any district in which the

26. Id.
27. Id. at 276-78.
28. Id.
29. United States v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Reviser’s Note, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3237(a)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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kidnapping was committed, or only in the single district in which the
firearm was used during the kidnapping.33 The defendant, RodriguezMoreno, was hired by a disgruntled drug distributor to locate a rival
dealer who had stolen the distributor’s cocaine.34 The distributor
instructed Rodriguez-Moreno to kidnap the dealer’s middleman for
leverage during the search.35 Rodriguez-Moreno kidnapped the
middleman in Texas and held the middleman captive as he drove to
Maryland through Texas, New Jersey, and New York.36 While in
Maryland, Rodriguez-Moreno took possession of a firearm and put the
firearm to the back of the middleman’s head, threatening to shoot
him.37 Rodriguez-Moreno was charged with using and carrying a
firearm in relation to kidnapping.38 Although the government only
proved that Rodriguez-Moreno used the firearm in Maryland, he was
tried in the District of New Jersey.39 The Court reasoned that to
determine the locus delicti40 of a crime, courts must first determine the
nature of the crime by “identify[ing] the conduct constituting the
offense … and then discern the location of the commission of the
criminal acts.”41 Applying this standard, the Court determined that the
charged offense consisted of two conduct elements: the using of a
firearm and the commission of a kidnapping.42 The Court reasoned that
kidnapping is a continuing offense because kidnapping does not occur
within a discrete point in time, but instead, continues until the victim
is free.43 In addressing the location element of the venue inquiry, the
Court relied on its previous ruling in United States v. Lombardo, where
the Court reasoned that “‘where a crime consists of distinct parts which
have different localities, the whole may be tried where any part can be
proved to have been done.’”44 Therefore, the Court held that venue in
New Jersey was proper because the charged offense consisted of both
the using of the firearm and the kidnapping.45 Kidnapping is a
33. 526 U.S. 275, 276 (1999).
34. Id. at 276-77.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 277.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Locus delecti is a Latin term meaning the “scene of the crime.” It refers to the location where
a criminal offense was committed. Locus delecti, USLEGAL.COM, https://definitions.uslegal.com/l/locusdelicti/ [https://perma.cc/ZF2F-J5TE].
41. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279 (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1998)).
42. Id. at 280.
43. Id. at 281.
44. Id. (quoting United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 60 (1916)).
45. Id. at 282.
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continuous offense which could be properly tried in any state in which
any part of it took place, including New Jersey.46 Thus, the entire
charged offense could be properly tried in New Jersey because one
distinct part of the offense could be tried in New Jersey.47
In Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Supreme Court determined whether the
Child Online Protection Act’s (“COPA”) use of community standards
to identify material that is harmful to minors violated the First
Amendment.48 Although the case dealt with a legal issue unrelated to
venue, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provided a rare glimpse into the
Court’s interpretation of section 3237(a).49 In particular, because
COPA does not include an explicit venue provision, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that venue under the Act may be governed by section
3237(a).50 Justice Kennedy concluded that a violation of COPA does,
in fact, fall within the scope of section 3237(a) because “the Act’s
prohibition includes an interstate commerce element” and, thus,
qualifies as an “offense involving … transportation in interstate …
commerce” that may be tried “in any district from, through, or into
which such commerce … moves.”51 In this way, Justice Kennedy
indicated that, in order to constitute an “offense involving . . . interstate
… commerce” within the meaning of section 3237(a), interstate
commerce must be one of the elements of the offense.52
C. The Circuit Courts’ Interpretations of Section 3237(a)

The federal circuit courts are split as to whether an offense involving
transportation in interstate commerce as used in section 3237(a)
encompasses any offense that takes place on a form of transportation
in interstate commerce or only refers to offenses in which
transportation in interstate commerce is one of the conduct elements
of the offense.53
In United States v. McCulley, the Eleventh Circuit determined
whether a defendant who had stowed himself away in the cargo hold
of an airplane and stolen from the United States mail could be properly
tried in the district in which the airplane landed.54 The defendant

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002).
See id. at 601-02.
Id.
Id.
See id.
18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).
673 F.2d 346, 348-49 (11th Cir. 1982).
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boarded a non-stop flight from Los Angeles to Atlanta by locking
himself inside a suitcase.55 During the flight, the defendant opened the
suitcase and began to loot several United States mail bags located
inside the cargo hold.56 After being discovered and apprehended in
Atlanta, the defendant was tried and convicted of stealing mail in the
Northern District of Georgia.57 The court concluded that, under section
3237(a), any criminal offense committed on a form of transportation
in interstate commerce is a continuing offense that may be properly
tried in any district “from, through, or into which” the transportation
in interstate commerce moved.58 The court reasoned that Congress
enacted section 3237(a) to ensure that defendants who commit crimes
while traveling in interstate commerce do not avoid prosecution
merely because of a lack of venue.59 Therefore, the court held that the
charged offense fell within the scope of section 3237(a) because the
defendant committed the offense while traveling on an airplane.60 As
such, venue was proper in the Northern District of Georgia, the district
in which the airplane had landed.61
In contrast, the Second Circuit concluded that section 3237(a)
applies to an offense only when transportation in interstate commerce
is itself an element of the offense.62 Specifically, in United States v.
Brennan, the Second Circuit determined whether defendants charged
with mail fraud could be properly tried in the district through which
the fraudulent mail traveled.63 The court noted that Congress enacted
section 3237(a) in direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson, which held that the offense of using “the mails or any
instrumentality of interstate commerce” to send dentures into a state
that were cast by a person not licensed to practice dentistry in that state
must be prosecuted in the specific district in which the mailing of the
illegal dentures occurred.64 Thus, the court reasoned that Congress
intended section 3237(a) to address the narrow issue of venue in
offenses analogous to the offense at issue in Johnson—offenses in
which use of the mails or an instrumentality of interstate commerce is
an element of the offense.65 Therefore, the court held that section
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 348.
Id.
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 146 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1821).
Id. at 147.
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3237(a) did not apply to the offense of mail fraud because the elements
of the offense merely involved “acts of depositing or receiving mail,
or causing it to be delivered, rather than by the more general and
ongoing act of ‘using the mails.’”66 As such, the court concluded that
mail fraud was not a “continuing offense” within the meaning of
section 3237(a) and, thus, the defendants could not be properly tried in
any district through which the mail traveled but only in the districts in
which the defendants deposited or received the mail.67
In United States v. Morgan, the D.C. Circuit similarly held that,
under section 3237(a), an offense is only an “offense involving the use
of the mails [or] transportation in interstate … commerce” when use
of the mails or transportation in interstate commerce is one of the
elements of the offense.68 The court reasoned that because section
3237(a) employs the term “offense” which refers to a particular crime,
the language of the statute itself instructs courts to look only to the
elements of the underlying crime, and not to the circumstances
surrounding the crime, to determine whether it constitutes an offense
involving transportation in interstate commerce.69 Therefore, the court
concluded that crimes committed while a defendant travels in interstate
commerce, but that do not include transportation in interstate
commerce as an element of the crime, are not “offenses involving . . .
transportation in interstate … commerce” for the purposes of section
3237(a) and, thus, can only be properly tried in the specific district in
which the crime occurred.70 The court reasoned that an interpretation
of section 3237(a) as encompassing any crime that occurs in interstate
commerce would result in an untenable expansion of available venue
sites under section 3237(a) because almost every criminal offense
“involves circumstances in which a person or instrumentality related
to the crime” has traveled in interstate commerce.71
In United States v. Auernheimer, the Third Circuit further clarified
that to determine whether an offense is a continuing offense within the
meaning of section 3237(a), courts must distinguish between the
essential conduct elements that constitute the charged offense and the
circumstance elements which are merely facts that existed at the time
the defendant committed the offense.72 The Third Circuit held that only

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 393 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 200-01.
72. 748 F.3d 525, 533 (3d Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th
Cir. 2011).
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essential conduct elements can serve as a basis for venue.73 As such,
venue is not proper in a district when only a circumstance element of
the offense occurred in that district.74
D. United States v. Breitweiser, United States v. Cope, and United
States v. Lozoya

In United States v. Breitweiser, the Eleventh Circuit determined
whether a defendant could be properly tried for engaging in abusive
sexual contact with a minor and assault of a minor while on an airplane
in the district in which the airplane landed.75 The defendant,
Breitweiser, boarded a flight from Houston to Atlanta and sat next to
a fourteen-year-old girl and her eighteen-year-old sister.76 During the
flight, Breitweiser placed his hand on the fourteen-year-old girl’s leg
and rubbed it up and down her inner thigh.77 Additionally, the
fourteen-year-old girl testified that, at some point in the flight, she saw
Breitweiser masturbating under pillows and a magazine.78 Breitweiser
was tried and convicted of abusive sexual contact with a minor and
assault of a minor in the Northern District of Georgia, the district in
which the plane landed.79
Relying on the court’s decision in McCulley, the Eleventh Circuit
held that an offense falls within the scope of section 3237(a) if the
offense occurred on an instrumentality of interstate commerce.80 The
Eleventh Circuit dismissed Breitweiser’s argument that venue is only
proper in the Northern District of Georgia if the government
establishes that he committed the charged offenses in the airspace
above the Northern District of Georgia, reasoning that “it would be
difficult if not impossible for the government to prove . . . exactly
which federal district was beneath the plane when Breitweiser
committed the crimes.”81 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that an
interpretation of section 3237(a) that imposes such a great burden on
the government to establish proper venue for a crime committed in
interstate commerce directly contradicts Congress’s intent. Namely,
Congress intended for section 3237(a) to ensure that crimes committed

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 533.
Id.
357 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1252.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1253.
Id.
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in interstate commerce will not escape prosecution for lack of venue.82
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit determined that to establish venue
under section 3237(a), the government need only show that the
defendant committed the charged offense while traveling in interstate
commerce.83 Thus, because Breitweiser committed the charged
offenses while flying on an airplane, under section 3237(a), the
government could properly prosecute him in “any district from,
through, or into which” the airplane moved, including the Northern
District of Georgia.84
In United States v. Cope, the Tenth Circuit similarly held that an
“offense involving … transportation in interstate … commerce,” as
used in section 3237(a), refers to any criminal offense committed on a
mode of transportation in interstate commerce.85 The defendant, Cope,
was a co-pilot on a commercial flight from Texas to Colorado.86
During the flight, Cope’s captain smelled alcohol in the cockpit and
eventually discovered that the smell was coming from Cope.87 After
the plane landed in Colorado, Cope took a breathalyzer test that
revealed he was inebriated.88 Cope was tried and convicted of
operating a common carrier while under the influence of alcohol in the
District of Colorado.89 The Tenth Circuit concluded that because Cope
was under the influence of alcohol during a flight traveling in interstate
commerce, under section 3237(a), venue was proper in any district
through which the flight traveled, including the District of Colorado.90
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that because section 3237(a) encompasses
any offense committed while traveling in interstate commerce, the
government was not required to show that Cope was under the
influence of alcohol specifically in Colorado.91 Rather, the undisputed
evidence that Cope was under the influence of alcohol during the flight
was sufficient to establish that, under section 3237(a), venue was
proper in the District of Colorado.92
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Lozoya held that,
under section 3237(a), an offense only qualifies as an “offense
involving … transportation in interstate … commerce” when traveling
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 1253-54.
Id.
Id.
676 F.3d, 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id.
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in interstate commerce is one of the elements of the offense.93 In
Lozoya, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine whether the proper
venue for an assault committed on an airplane was the district in which
the airplane landed.94 During a commercial flight from Minneapolis to
Los Angeles, the defendant, Lozoya, was unable to sleep because the
passenger sitting behind her, Wolff, constantly bumped her seat.95
Later in the flight, Lozoya confronted Wolff and, after a heated
exchange, Lozoya hit Wolff in the face with her hand, causing his nose
to bleed.96 Lozoya was tried and convicted of assault in the district
where the flight had landed, the Central District of California.97
Applying the two-pronged test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Rodriguez-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit found that the only essential
conduct element of the charged offense was the assault.98 Because the
assault did not occur within the Central District of California, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that, under Rodriguez-Moreno, the offense could not
be properly tried in that district.99
The Ninth Circuit next turned to the government’s argument that
venue was proper in the Central District of California under section
3237(a).100 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the first paragraph of
section 3237(a) did not confer venue in the Central District of
California because that provision applies only to continuing offenses
that are committed across multiple districts and Lozoya’s assault was
a point-in-time offense that “occurred in an instant and likely in the
airspace of only one district.”101 Further, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the second paragraph of section 3237(a) also did not confer venue
in the Central District of California because, although the assault
occurred on an airplane, travel in interstate commerce is not itself an
element of assault.102 The court reasoned that, even if the fact that the
crime occurred on an airplane is construed as an element of the assault,
it would be a circumstance element rather than a conduct element of
the offense, which cannot provide a basis for venue.103 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit held that Lozoya could be properly tried only in the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

920 F.3d 1231, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1233-34.
Id. at 1235-36.
Id. at 1239.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1240.
Id.
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specific district above which the assault occurred.104 Thus, because the
assault did not occur above the Central District of California, venue in
that district was improper.105
The Ninth Circuit recognized that its interpretation of section
3237(a) conflicted with that of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits but
concluded that the reasoning of the other circuits was flawed because
both circuits failed to evaluate the nature of the conduct constituting
the offense as required by the two-pronged Rodriguez-Moreno test
and, instead, focused on the practical difficulties of requiring the
government to prove exactly which district the plane was flying over
when the crime occurred.106
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized the “creeping absurdity in
[its] holding,” the court concluded that the clear mandate of the
Constitution and the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez-Moreno
trumped the practical concerns expressed by the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits.107 The Ninth Circuit noted that it is within the authority of
Congress, rather than the courts, to address “any irrationality that
might follow from the [court’s] conclusion” by enacting legislation
that establishes a more practical and workable standard for
determining venue when a crime occurs during a flight.108
The dissent in Lozoya disagreed with the majority’s interpretation
of the second paragraph of section 3237(a), arguing that the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits were correct in holding that an “offense involving
… transportation in interstate … commerce” encompasses any crime
committed while traveling in interstate commerce.109 The dissent
reasoned that the majority’s construction of section 3237(a) makes
prosecuting in-flight crimes nearly impossible and may even result in
the infliction of further harm to victims by requiring them to recount
the exact moment when a traumatic crime occurred.110 Additionally,
the dissent argued that requiring the prosecution of an in-flight crime
in “a ‘flyover state’ where the defendant and potential witnesses have
no ties” does not serve the fundamental purpose of venue to protect a
defendant’s right to a fair trial.111 Further, allowing an in-flight crime
to be prosecuted in the district in which the flight lands does not
necessarily disadvantage the defendant or undermine the defendant’s
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1243.
Id.
Id. at 1240-41.
Id. at 1242-43.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1244-45.
Id.
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right to a fair trial.112 Thus, the dissent concluded that the majority’s
interpretation of section 3237(a) is entirely inconsistent with
Congress’s intent in enacting the statute.113
III. DISCUSSION

The Ninth Circuit adopted the correct interpretation of section
3237(a) in Lozoya. Although the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
misidentified the difference between its own determination of proper
venue for in-flight crimes and that of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’,
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of an offense involving the use of
transportation in interstate commerce is consistent with Congress’s
legislative purpose in enacting section 3237(a). Further, the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) adheres to the narrow
construction of venue provisions set forth by the Supreme Court in
Johnson. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Ashcroft v. ACLU also
lends support to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a)
by suggesting that the Supreme Court tends to interpret the term “any
offense involving the use of … transportation in interstate …
commerce” in accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lozoya.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) adheres to
the distinction between circumstance elements and essential conducts
elements of a criminal offense drawn by the Third Circuit for the
purposes of establishing proper venue. Although the dissent in Lozoya
raises valid concerns regarding the feasibility of the majority’s
interpretation of section 3237(a), Congress—not the judiciary—has
the authority to amend the language of the statute or enact a new venue
statute to address the practical difficulties of establishing proper venue
for point in time offenses committed while traveling in interstate
commerce.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Lozoya misidentifies the source of
the current circuit split

The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Lozoya regarding the difference
between its own determination of proper venue for in-flight crimes and
that of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ is erroneous. In Lozoya, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that its holding contradicted that of the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ but concluded that neither the Tenth
Circuit’s reasoning in Cope nor the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in

112. Id. at 1245.
113. Id. at 1244-45.
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Breitweiser was persuasive. The Ninth Circuit argued that neither the
Tenth nor Eleventh Circuits analyzed the essential conduct elements
of the charged offense when determining the locus delecti of the crime
and, thus, failed to comply with the first prong of the RodriguezMoreno test. However, the difference between the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits’ conclusion and the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion regarding
proper venue for in-flight crimes is not, in fact, attributable to
differences in the Circuits’ application of the Rodriguez-Moreno
framework. Even if the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits had been more
explicit about their application of the Rodriguez-Moreno framework,
the result in Breitweiser and Cope would have been the same because
the charged offenses at issue in Breitweiser and Cope were continuing
offenses while the charged offense at issue in Lozoya was a point-intime offense.
Applying the first prong of the Rodriguez-Moreno test to the facts
in Breitweiser, the essential conduct elements of the charged offenses
of abusive sexual contact with a minor and assault of a minor occurred
continuously throughout the flight rather than in one particular instant
and, thus, constituted continuous offenses. Therefore, under the second
prong of the Rodriguez-Moreno test, the charged offense occurred
across multiple districts and, thus, falls within the scope of the first
sentence of section 3237(a). As such, the defendant could be properly
tried in any district in which the offense was begun, continued, or
completed. Because the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct
throughout the flight, the Eleventh Circuit correctly concluded that
venue was proper in any district from, through, or into which the flight
traveled.
Similarly, in Cope, the essential conduct elements of the charged
offense consisted of operating a commercial airplane while under the
influence of alcohol which occurred continuously throughout the flight
as opposed to within a particular instant in time. As such, the charged
offense was a continuous offense that occurred across multiple
districts. Therefore, the offense fell within the scope of the first
sentence of section 3237(a) and venue was proper in any district in
which the offense was begun, continued, or completed. Because, by
definition, the charged offense continued throughout the duration of
the flight, the Tenth Circuit correctly held that the defendant could be
tried in any district from, through, or into which the flight traveled.
In contrast, the charged offense of assault in Lozoya was a point-intime offense rather than a continuous offense because the essential
conduct element of the assault, the defendant’s act of punching her
fellow passenger in the nose, occurred in a single instant in time and,
thus, in a single location and district. Unlike in Breitweiser and Cope,
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the charged offense in Lozoya did not fall within the scope of the first
sentence of section 3237(a). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was mistaken
in attributing the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions regarding the
proper venue for in-flight crimes to their failure to apply the twopronged Rodriguez-Moreno test. Even if the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits had more explicitly employed the Rodriguez-Moreno test, the
circuits would have arrived at the exact same conclusions.
The difference between the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ conclusion
and the Ninth Circuits’ conclusion is actually attributable to the
circuits’ varied interpretations of what is required to invoke the second
sentence of section 3237(a). Specifically, in Lozoya, the Ninth Circuit
determined that, in order to be considered an offense involving
interstate commerce under section 3237(a), it is not sufficient for the
charged offense to have merely occurred on an airplane, but rather,
travel in interstate commerce must be one of the elements of the
charged offense itself. In contrast, in Cope and Breitweiser, the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits determined that to qualify as an offense
involving interstate commerce under section 3237(a), the charged
offense need only have occurred on an instrument of interstate
commerce. Had the Ninth Circuit in Lozoya applied the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits’ interpretation of an offense involving interstate
commerce, the Ninth Circuit would have reached the same conclusion
as the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. Because the charged offense of
assault occurred on an airplane traveling in interstate commerce, the
defendant could be properly tried in any district from, through, or into
which the airplane traveled. Therefore, rather than originating from the
circuits’ differing applications of the Rodriguez-Moreno framework,
the circuit split created by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lozoya
originates from the circuits’ distinct interpretations of what constitutes
an offense involving interstate commerce within the meaning of
section 3237(a).
B. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) in Lozoya is
consistent with Congress’s legislative intent

Although the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as to the source of the
current circuit split is erroneous, the Ninth Circuit, nonetheless,
adopted the correct interpretation of section 3237(a) in Lozoya. In
particular, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) best
serves Congress’s legislative intent in enacting the statute. Congress
passed section 3237(a). As noted by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Brennan, because use of the mail or an instrumentality of
interstate commerce was an element of the charged offense at issue in
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Johnson, it appears that Congress intended section 3237(a) to apply
only to offenses in which interstate commerce or use of the mail is
actually an element of the offense rather than to any criminal offense
that happens to be committed on a mode of transportation in interstate
commerce. As such, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the in-flight
assault charged in Lozoya was not an offense involving interstate
commerce is consistent with Congress’s intent that section 3237(a)
applies only where traveling in interstate commerce is one of the
elements of the offense. Traveling in interstate commerce is not an
element of assault, so assault was not in the purview of the crimes
contemplated by Congress when enacting section 3237(a).114
In contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretation of
section 3237(a) is entirely inconsistent with Congress’s legislative
intent in enacting the venue statute. In Cope and Breitweiser, the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ conclusion that an offense involving
interstate commerce—as used in section 3237(a)—encompasses any
criminal offense committed on a mode of transportation in interstate
commerce wholly overlooks the direct relationship between Johnson
and Congress’ decision to enact section 3237(a). In addressing the
legislative intent behind section 3237(a), neither the Tenth nor
Eleventh Circuit discussed the legislative history of the statute as a
direct reaction to the Court’s decision in Johnson, but rather blindly
relied on the reasoning provided in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
United States v. McCulley. In McCulley, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Congress intended section 3237(a) to serve as a
“catchall provision” designed to ensure that crimes committed while
traveling in interstate commerce did not avoid prosecution simply
because of a lack of venue.115 However, the Eleventh Circuit provided
no substantive evidence from the statute’s plain language or legislative
history to support this assertion. Instead, in support of its
interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit merely provided citations to
analogous venue statutes enacted by state legislatures which are
largely irrelevant to the specific question of Congress’s intent in
enacting section 3237(a).
Further, in Breitweiser, the Eleventh Circuit not only blindly
adhered to the reasoning provided in McCulley, but also mistakenly
relied on pure policy-based reasoning to support its interpretation of
section 3237(a). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
section 3237(a) must apply to any crime that occurs during travel in
interstate commerce because an interpretation of section 3237(a) that
114. “An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury
on the person of another.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (Deering 2019).
115. United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982).
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requires the government to prove exactly which federal district was
underneath the plane precisely when the defendant committed the
crime would impose a great burden on the government in establishing
proper venue for in-flight crimes that Congress could not have possibly
intended when enacting the statute. Regardless of whether the practical
difficulties raised by the Eleventh Circuit are valid, these issues of
policy are for the legislature, rather than the courts, to decide.116 By
explicitly enacting section 3237(a) in direct response to the Court’s
decision in Johnson, Congress signaled that it has decided that the
great public interest in maintaining venue as a constitutional protection
for criminal defendants outweighs policy concerns regarding the
practical difficulties imposed on the state in determining proper venue
for in-flight crimes. In this way, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’
interpretation of section 3237(a) is not founded on actual evidence of
legislative intent but merely on the unsubstantiated conclusions set
forth in McCulley and various policy concerns better suited for the
legislature than the judiciary. Therefore, in neglecting to consider the
relationship between Congress’s enactment of section 3237(a) and the
Court’s decision in Johnson, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits adopted
an interpretation of section 3237(a) that is wholly inconsistent with
Congress’s true legislative intent in enacting the venue statute.
C. The Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson and Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Ashcroft v. ACLU support the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of section 3237(a)

The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) best comports
with the narrow construction of venue provisions set forth by the
Supreme Court in Johnson. Applying the Supreme Court’s restrictive
interpretation of venue provisions to section 3237(a) suggests that
courts should not interpret the statute to apply broadly to any crime
that occurs during travel in interstate commerce, but only to the narrow
class of offenses in which travel in interstate commerce is an element
of the offense itself. Specifically, because the term offense involving
the use of transportation in interstate commerce is ambiguous and
undefined, the statute can reasonably be interpreted to apply either to
any crime that occurs during travel in interstate commerce or only to
crimes in which travel in interstate commerce is an element of the
offense.117 Because the language of 3237(a) is reasonably susceptible
116. See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275-77 (1944).
117. See Larry M. Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends,
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE
8
(2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z3GM-E2BK].
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to either interpretation, the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson
instructs courts to interpret the statute narrowly as applying only where
travel in interstate commerce is an element of the underlying criminal
offense. As explained by the Court in Johnson, this restrictive
interpretation of section 3237(a) best ensures that the venue safeguards
the Framer’s included in the Constitution continue to protect the rights
of criminal defendants.
In contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ decision to adopt a
broad interpretation of offense involving transportation in interstate
commerce as referring to any crime committed during travel in
interstate commerce entirely disregards the Supreme Court’s mandate
in Johnson. Consequently, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions
undermine the constitutional policy underlying the venue safeguards
the Framer’s intended to protect the rights of criminal defendants.
Thus, in light of Johnson, the Ninth Circuit, rather than the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits, adopted the correct interpretation of section
3237(a).
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justice Souter and Justice
Ginsburg, in Ashcroft v. ACLU lends additional support to the narrow
interpretation of section 3237(a) adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Lozoya. Like the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy evaluated whether
section 3237(a) governed venue for a violation of COPA by looking to
the elements of a COPA offense and determining whether they
expressly included transportation in interstate commerce. Contrary to
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions in Cope and Breitweiser,
Justice Kennedy’s inquiry into the application of section 3237(a) to a
COPA violation included no consideration of whether a COPA offense
may happen to occur during transportation in interstate commerce.
Additionally, Justice Kennedy concluded that a violation of COPA
constitutes an offense involving the use of transportation in interstate
commerce within the meaning of section 3237(a) specifically because
travel in interstate commerce is an element of the offense. Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence supports the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that
courts should interpret section 3237(a) to apply only where travel in
interstate commerce is an element of the charged offense itself.
Although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Ashcroft v. ACLU only
provides insight into a few of the justice’s interpretations of section
3237(a), when considered in conjunction with the foregoing evidence,
it nonetheless suggests that, should the Court decide to review this
circuit split, the Court is more likely to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
restrictive interpretation of section 3237(a) than the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuit’s expansive interpretation of section 3237(a) as
correct.
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D. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) ensures that
only the essential conduct elements of a criminal offense serve as a basis
for venue

The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) is also
consistent with the Third Circuit’s holding in Auernheimer that only
the essential conduct elements of an offense may serve as a basis for
venue. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section
3237(a) requires courts to determine whether an offense constitutes an
offense involving the use of transportation in interstate commerce by
looking to the essential conduct elements of the underlying criminal
offense and determining whether travel in interstate commerce is one
of those essential conduct elements. Consistent with the Third
Circuit’s decision in Auernheimer, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
section 3237(a) ensures that only the essential conduct elements of the
underlying criminal offense serve as a basis for venue.
In contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretation of
section 3237(a) allows courts to determine that an offense constitutes
an offense involving transportation in interstate commerce by merely
looking to the circumstance elements surrounding the commission of
the crime and discerning whether the crime took place on an
instrument of interstate commerce. Thus, contrary to the Third
Circuit’s decision in Auernheimer, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’
interpretation of section 3237(a) permits a finding of proper venue in
a district in which only a circumstance element of the offense—travel
in interstate commerce—occurred in that district. The Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the statute adheres to this distinction between
circumstance elements and conduct elements of a criminal offense for
the purpose of venue.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit adopted the correct interpretation of
section 3237(a) in Lozoya. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation best
serves Congress’s legislative intent in enacting section 3237(a) and is
most consistent with the restrictive interpretation of venue provisions
set forth by the Supreme Court in Johnson. Additionally, Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Ashcroft v. ACLU indicates that the
Supreme Court is more likely to interpret section 3237(a) in
accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lozoya. Further, the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 3237(a) is consistent with the
Third Circuit’s holding in Auernheimer that only essential conduct
elements of an offense may provide a basis for venue.
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E. The practical concerns raised by the dissent in Lozoya must be
resolved by legislative, rather than judicial, action

The dissent in Lozoya raises valid issues regarding the feasibility
and “‘creeping absurdity’” of the majority’s interpretation of section
3237(a). For example, under the Ninth Circuit’s narrow construction
of an offense involving transportation in interstate commerce, in order
to properly prosecute a crime that occurred on a flight from New York
to Los Angeles, the state would have to pinpoint exactly which out of
the hundreds of districts the flight flew over the plane was flying above
at the exact moment when the crime was committed. In cases involving
crimes of sexual abuse or misconduct, like Breitweiser, this would
require victims to relive their traumatic experiences in order to recount
exactly when the crime occurred. Further, in instances where the state
is unable to pinpoint the exact location of the crime or lacks the
resources to engage in the extensive investigation necessary to
determine the exact location, serious criminal offenses will go
unprosecuted merely because they happened to occur while traveling
in interstate commerce.
However, these policy considerations are within the purview of
Congress, not the courts. As evidenced by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Johnson, the legislature, not the judiciary, has the authority
to enact venue provisions that define particular crimes as continuing
offenses that may be tried in any district from, through, or into which
the offense was committed. In fact, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson indicated that in cases where the language of a venue
provision is ambiguous, the role of the courts is limited to strictly
construing the venue provision as enacted by Congress in order to
protect criminal defendants’ constitutional right to a fair trial. Further,
the relationship between the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson and
Congress’s subsequent enactment of section 3237(a) suggests that
where Congress perceives that the courts’ strict interpretation of a
venue provision creates practical difficulties or policy concerns, it is
Congress’s role to pass a new venue provision that addresses and
resolves these concerns. It is this pattern that should be followed here.
Due to the practical difficulties that arise when the state is required
to prosecute in-flight offenses that fall outside the scope of section
3237(a) in the exact district above which the offense occurred,
Congress should enact a new venue statute or amend section 3237(a)
to address proper venue for crimes that merely occur while traveling
in interstate commerce. However, until Congress decides to address
this venue issue, it is the role of the courts to strictly construe the
language of section 3237(a) and apply it only to offenses in which
traveling in interstate commerce is an element of the offense itself.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/8

20

Pinto: Venue on Commercial Carriers

2020]

VENUE FOR CRIMES ON COMMERCIAL CARRIERS

1187

Therefore, although the dissent raises valid concerns regarding the
practical effects of the majority’s decision, the Ninth Circuit correctly
adopted a narrow interpretation of section 3237(a) regardless of its
own concerns regarding the “creeping absurdity” of its decision, and
properly invited Congress to address the issue of venue for in-flight
crimes.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit adopted the correct interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §
3237(a) in Lozoya because Congress, not the courts, possesses the
authority to legislate. Therefore, courts must apply legislation as
written and conclude that all in-flight offenses should be treated as
continuing offenses that may be properly tried in any district from,
through, or into which the airplane traveled.
Although the Ninth Circuit correctly adopted an interpretation that
adheres to Congress’s legislative intent in enacting section 3237(a),
Congress should take heed of the legitimate practical difficulties that
arise from the statute’s limited application and take action either to
amend section 3237(a) or enact a new venue statute that addresses the
venue issues created by in-flight criminal offenses. For example,
insisting that an in-flight crime be prosecuted in the exact district
above which the offense occurred does not actually protect criminal
defendants’ rights as contemplated by the Framers; instead, this is
actually more likely to result in the very infringement of a criminal
defendant’s rights that the Framers sought to avoid, forcing criminal
defendants to defend themselves in foreign districts where they have
no ties. Further, not only does the current legislative regime provide
insufficient protection to criminal defendants, but it also allows
criminal offenses to go unprosecuted merely because of the great
difficulty of establishing proper venue. Because of the sheer number
of districts over which an airplane flies during a single flight,
pinpointing the exact district over which an offense occurred is
extremely difficult and may require the prosecutor to ask victims of
violent crimes or sexual assault and misconduct to recall painful events
in excruciating detail. The difficulty of this task combined with the
limited resources and time possessed by most prosecutor’s offices118
almost ensures that a great deal of in-flight crimes will avoid
prosecution for lack of proper venue. In the future, this issue will
become more prevalent if the number of in-flight crimes committed
118. Daniel S. Lawrence et al., Prosecutor Priorities, Challenges, and Solutions, RAND, 4-5
(2019), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2800/RR2892/RAND_
RR2892.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LPM-WTVG].
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continues its upward trend.119
For these reasons, although the Ninth Circuit correctly adopted an
interpretation that adheres to Congress’s legislative intent in enacting
section 3237(a), Congress should take action either to amend section
3237(a) or enact a new venue statute that addresses the venue issues
created by in-flight criminal offenses.

119. See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 10.
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